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Semantic properties are not commonly held to be part of the basic 
ontological furniture of the world. Consequently, we confront a 
problem: how to 'naturalize' semantics so as to reveal these 
properties in their true ontological colors? Dominant naturalistic 
theories address semantic properties as properties of some other 
(more primitive, less problematic) kind. The reductionistic flavor is 
unmistakable. The following quote from Fodor's Psychosemantics is 
probably the contemporary locus classicus of this trend. Fodor is 
commendably unapologetic: 
 
I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the 
catalogue they've been compiling of the ultimate and 
irreducible properties of things. When they do, the likes of 
spin, charm, and charge will perhaps appear upon their list. But 
aboutness surely won't; intentionality simply doesn't go that 
deep. It's hard to see, in the face of this consideration, how 
one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, 
to some extent or other, a Reductionist. If the semantic and 
the intentional are real properties of things, it must be in 
virtue of their identity with (or maybe of their supervenience 
on?) properties that are themselves neither intentional nor 
semantic. If aboutness is real, it must be really something 
else. 
(Fodor 1987, 97) 
 
 Notice the shape of this explanatory project. Intentional 
properties will count as real in virtue of their identity with, or 
supervenience on, some set of lower-level physical properties. Fodor 
thus assumes, in effect (as do many others engaged in 
naturalization projects for semantics), that the program of 
naturalization demands a higher-to-lower, top-to-bottom, kind of 
explanatory strategy. 
 This paper addresses precisely that assumption, namely, that 
the non-semantic properties on which semantic properties depend, 
belong to what are intuitively lower levels of description than the 
intentional level itself. It also questions the higher-to-lower 
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explanatory scheme associated with that assumption. My 
discussion of this topic draws on Robert Brandom's recent work 
(Brandom 1994) and can be considered an analysis of Brandom's 
stance and its implications. The discussion should help to explain 
the general lack of progress in the project of naturalizing content. It 
should also help show why attempts to eliminate the normative 
vocabulary employed in specifying the practices that guide the use of 
a language are unlikely to succeed.  
 I shall start by displaying the general order of explanation 
that characterizes typical naturalization projects, showing that even 
when a full reduction to physics is avoided, some important 
assumptions inherited from the explanatory model of physics 
remain. These include the demand for an array of causal 
explanations couched in terms of ultimate properties of the world, 
and the idea that such non-semantic properties should be 
constitutive (in a narrow or individualistic sense to be explained 
below) of whatever semantic properties are in question. Extending 
Brandom's idea that the normativity of content is not reducible to 
physics, I shall argue that even such residual demands are 
inappropriate. More positively, I suggest that, despite the deep 
irreducibility of the normative dimension of content, we need not 
consider that dimension either primitive or inexplicable. Instead, 
such normative aspects can be unpacked by invoking a different, 
lower-to-higher, explanatory scheme in which the explanans includes 




2. Explanation and Causal Explanation 
 
Classic positivist models of reduction involved the explanation of the 
laws of a higher-level science by the laws of a lower-level science 
through the application of bridge laws. The aim was to reduce one 
science to another —and ultimately all of science to physics (Cf. 
Nagel 1961). This positivistic model is now perceived to be too 
strong for the purposes of naturalizing semantics. However, one 
important aspect of that model still informs most attempts to 
naturalize semantics: this aspect concerns the causal explicability of 
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higher level properties by lower level ones (Cf. Salmon 1984). The 
semantic naturalist demands that intentional properties be causally 
explicable in terms of some other class of more basic properties, 
even if there is no ultimate reduction to physics (Cf. Brooks 1994). 
 Recall the opening quote from Fodor —taken as representative 
of a widespread contemporary tendency. The explanatory strategy, in 
practice, consists in depicting linguistic intentionality as derivative 
from mental intentionality, and mental intentionality as derivative 
in turn from more basic cognitive properties. The content of a 
linguistic expression is derived from some array of cognitive 
capacities and those cognitive capacities are seen as the result of 
some rather complex organization of human wetware. This putative 
chain of dependencies between mental and linguistic content helps 
us to understand why contemporary philosophy of language and 
contemporary philosophy of mind have become more and more a 
single discipline. As linguistic properties are seen as derivative from 
properties of contentful mental states, the study of content focuses 
mainly on mental representations. An account of mental content is 
taken to be essential to providing an account of linguistic content. 
 Now, supposing that intentional content is nothing but the 
meaning of mental representations and that internal processes are 
only sensitive to the syntactic structures of mental representations, 
not their meaning, one of the first problems the semantic naturalist 
has to face is how to uphold the idea —absolutely plausible from an 
intuitive point of view— that the intentional content of a thought (or 
any other intentional state) is causally responsible for behavioural 
(and other) outputs. It quickly seems that if we want to uphold such 
an idea, and to do so on a good physicalist basis, we will need to 
postulate the existence of micro-physical mechanisms or structures 
corresponding to different types of semantic events and subsumable 
by laws. The semantic event-types are thus considered causally 
efficacious only insofar as they supervene on micro-physical events 
—perhaps different ones on different occasions— in such a way that 
the causal powers of the former are explained by the causal powers 
of the latter. 
 We need to talk about types of events because, although only 
individual events can be causes, the explanatory character of the 
regularities captured by a causal law depends on such regularities 
 4 
being established not between particular events, but between types 
of events. Now, since particular events can be referred to by many 
different expressions, some of which don’t mirror any of the 
properties that turn them into causes or effects of other events, the 
criteria for grouping together particular events into events of the 
same type —events of the type that can appear in a causal law— 
must only focus on those properties that can be shown to be 
causally efficacious. To take a non-semantic example, although it 
might be true that the dinner on Sunday caused my stomach ache, 
the causal law on which such a truth depends doesn’t invoke any 
relation between events of the type to have dinner on Sunday and 
stomach ache, but rather between events of a particular physical 
type, such as a certain composition of the food and an alteration in 
the digestive juices. Of course, when one applies the same strategy 
to semantics, the immediate risk is that of epiphenomenalism. In 
other words, the risk is that intentional states considered qua 
intentional, (i.e., considered as having a particular meaning), fail to 
appear causally responsible for our behavior because the semantic 
properties themselves don't contribute to the causal powers of the 
states to which they belong. The recent epidemic of papers 
concerning the causal efficacy of content1 reflects in part the 
perceived urgency of the search for a solution to the threat of 
epiphenomenalism; the urgency, that is, of the search for a physical 
causal-explanatory basis able to embrace semantic facts as properly 
explanatory of behavior. 
 Yet despite this very strong tendency, there are good reasons 
to believe that causation is just one particular kind —important but 
not unique— of determinative relation. In this vein, G. MacDonald 
comments that '[s]ome of the problems which have been thought to 
plague attempts to naturalize the mental ... arise out of a prejudice 
which restricts the proper form of scientific explanation to causal 
explanation' (MacDonald 1992, 242-243). Thus consider what Kim 
calls Cambridge dependency (Cf. Kim 1974). Socrates dies and, in 
virtue of this, Xantippe becomes a widow. Socrates' death and 
Xantippe's new marital status are surely not the same event, but 
what kind of relation holds between them? One difficulty with a 
causal account of the relation between these two events is that 
they are simultaneous. Also, the relation doesn't seem to 
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instantiate any nomic regularity, i.e., there doesn't seem to be any 
empirical law that could support a causal relation between Socrates' 
death and the widowing of Xantippe. What we have here is some 
kind of logical entailment, not a physicalist or causal connection: 
'Thus, one might say that the proposition that the death of Socrates 
occurred at t, taken in conjunction with the standing condition that 
Socrates was the husband of Xantippe at t, entails the proposition 
that the onset of Xantippe's widowhood occurred at t' (Kim 1974, 
43). 
 I said 'some kind of logical entailment' because the two 
events are not symmetrically related, as they would be if we took 
the notion of logical entailment at face value, i.e., if we took the 
relation to be that of a biconditional. Xantippe's widowhood depends 
on Socrates' death, but not the other way around. This asymmetric 
dependency can be better appreciated if we realize that while it 
seems intuitively true that 
 
If Socrates had not died at t, Xantippe would not have become 
a widow at t, 
 
the relation expressed by 
 
If Xantippe had not become a widow at t, Socrates would not 
have died at t 
 
seems far less commanding of our assent (Kim 1974, 43). The 
relation we wish to capture —the one between Socrates' death and 
the widowing of Xantippe— is an explanatory one, but not a causal-
explanatory relation. Although there is no causal connection 
between Socrates' death and Xantippe's widowhood, the former 
event explains the latter. Cases like these seem to constitute 
examples of good, non-causal, explanation. And what they show is 
that, once we look closely at the very notion of explanation, we see 
that 'explicability' is not necessarily to be equated with 'causal 
explicability'. Of course, this is not to say that we should abandon 
the notion of causal explanation. The point is only that other forms 
of explanation —that establish determinative but non-causal 
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relations between events— offer perfectly acceptable ways to render 




3. Institution versus Constitution. 
 
It could be argued that Cambridge dependencies á la Kim are good 
explanations only in an analytic, trivial sense. It's only because it's 
part of the meaning of 'widow' that one's husband has died that we 
consider Socrates' death as a good explanation of Xantippe's 
widowhood. This is an interesting objection, rooted, indeed, in the 
very fact that non-causal determinative relations of this kind do not 
figure in standard explanatory frameworks. But two points should 
help establish that the sense of triviality is only apparent. Firstly, 
what we understand by the term 'widow' depends very much on a 
range of social customs and institutions. It wouldn't make much 
sense (or, at least, it would make a different sense) to talk about 
widowhood in a society with no institution of marriage or in a 
society where polygamy was imposed on women. Under those 
circumstances, Kim's example wouldn't be a good explanation 
because there would be no determinative relation between Socrates' 
death and Xantippe's widowhood. Cambridge dependencies thus 
introduce a reversal of the usual order found in contemporary 
explanatory schemes. Not only do we give up the equivalence 
between 'explanation' and 'causal explanation', we also give up the 
higher-to-lower character of the explanation involved. Here, the 
explanans does not include properties from a lower level of 
description. On the contrary, it includes properties that belong to a 
much higher —in this case, social / institutional— level. If we look 
back at Fodor's quote, we realize that all that is required to make 
semantic properties non-mysterious is that they be accounted for in 
some non-intentional, non-semantic terms. The additional idea that 
those non-intentional, non-semantic properties must belong to a 
lower level is an optional extra. We must, of course, avoid circularity 
in the explanation of intentional affairs. But it is nowhere written 
that circularity can't be avoided by some kind of upwards-looking 
relation instead. 
 The second, and more important, point is that the rupture of 
the higher-to-lower explanatory strategy calls into question one of 
the core metaphysical notions in the framework of scientific 
explanation, the metaphysical notion of constitution. Let me dwell on 
this a little. The notion of constitution I have in mind is the one at 
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work in the thesis that what makes a thing into a thing of a certain 
kind is the relation between that thing and the stuff it is made of. 
Although there are other, more contextually oriented, ways of 
accounting for the exact nature of a particular thing (see below), 
constitution, understood in this narrow and individualistic sense, 
seems to be at the root of the model of explanation that informs 
most contemporary naturalistic proposals. It is this notion of 
constitution that demands that we cash out the connections 
between the internal properties of an entity and its surroundings in 
causal terms. Roughly, this is how the theses fit together. A 
particular piece of metal is constituted as e.g. a piece of gold if it is 
made of the right stuff, if its composition has the atomic number 79. 
What it is for a piece of metal to be gold is then fully explained by 
appealing to the properties of its internal structure. But it is also 
its internal structure that is important in accounting for whatever 
causal powers that piece of gold might have. 
 This notion of constitution ought to be distinguished from 
another kind of relation, also sometimes called a constitutive one, 
but which is more logical than metaphysical. The logical notion of 
constitution amounts to something like a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions that something has to meet for being a thing of 
a certain kind. In current debates, the phrase 'being constitutive of' 
—as opposed to 'constituting'— tends to refer to this logical cousin 
of the metaphysical notion. Thus even though it is constitutive of 
the number 2 to be the successor of the number 1 (in the logical 
sense of constitution), 2 is not constituted (in the metaphysical 
sense) by being a successor of 1. Most naturalistic approaches such 
as Functional Semantics (Block 1986), Interpretational Semantics 
(Cummins 1989), Information Based Semantics (Israel and Perry 
1990; Dretske 1988), Asymmetric Dependence Theory (Fodor 1990), 
Teleological Theories (Millikan 1984; Neander 1991) all aim to 
discover some set of lower level, non-semantic, properties in terms 
of which semantic properties are metaphysically constituted, i.e. 
those properties that make a given representation into the 
representation it is and that will explain why it is that 
representation (and hence why it has the semantic properties it 
has) rather than some other. Clearly the aforementioned attempts 
at naturalization are not looking for constituting properties in the 
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logical sense. The search is not for something like necessary and 
sufficient conditions. The search is rather for those non-semantic 
properties that play a (metaphysical) constitutive role in the 
instantiatiion of semantic properties. Underlying the model of 
explanation at work in contemporary naturalistic proposals there is 
thus not just the general physicalist bias mentioned earlier, but 
also the additional idea that what makes a thing into a thing of a 
certain kind is the relation between that thing and the stuff of 
which it is made. 
 To see this notion of constitution in action and to see how it 
invites the observed emphasis on causal relations, think of e.g. the 
internalism / externalism debate in philosophy of language. The 
internalist often agrees that e.g. the individuation of the contentful 
states of cognitive systems is somehow relative to the properties of 
the world that they inhabit. But for her, this is just to say that the 
world is what determines the agent's cognitive states (usually via 
sensory inputs), and not that external features play any role in 
constituting such states. In fact, one of the most characteristic 
features of internalism is precisely the metaphysically 
individualistic claim that only local features of a given mental 
representation are relevant to its constitution. The justification of 
the internalist view thus involves the idea that the causal powers of 
any event are completely determined by its local physical features. 
As a result, only content that is individuated in terms of a system's 
intrinsic properties is deemed adequate for a scientific explanation of 
behavior. 
 Now, as I said above, there is a more contextually oriented 
alternative to this way of accounting for the exact nature of a 
particular thing. John Haugeland and Tim van Gelder are among 
those who have most recently explored this possibility (Cf. 
Haugeland 1993 and van Gelder, 1993), referring to it as the 
'holistic' alternative:  
 
Roughly, holists see the fundamental nature of things as 
depending only upon some larger whole to which they belong 
... metaphysical holists see constitution as solely a matter of 
context; an individual entity is what it is in virtue of some 
larger structure or pattern into which it fits ... If an entity is 
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constituted as an A holistically, then to understand that 
entity as an A you have to understand the relevant larger 
whole and how As fit into it. To render an A intelligible as an 
A is to articulate its place in the larger whole. 
(van Gelder 1993, 67) 
 
 To avoid confusion between the individualistic and the holistic 
notions of constitution, I propose to label the latter notion 
'institution'. Institution is thus a context-oriented way of 
understanding what makes a particular entity into the entity it is. 
To say of something that it is instituted by such-and-such 
properties is to claim that its fundamental nature in best accounted 
for in terms of the properties of some specific context in which the 
entity is manifest, and thus to understand the entity as an entity of 
that particular kind involves an appreciation of the properties of 
that context. John Haugeland gives the familiar example of the 
ontology of chess pieces (Haugeland 1993, 4). Suppose we ask what 
makes something a queen in chess? Obviously queens are made of 
some material or another but this individualistic notion of 
constitution will not help us understand the fundamental nature of 
a queen. What makes something a queen can only be fully 
understood by focusing on the role that the piece plays in the larger 
game of chess and hence by focusing on contextual properties such 
as the rules of chess2. 
 Constitution and institution are not, of course, exclusive 
ontological relations. In most cases, that something is an entity of 
a particular kind results partially from the stuff it is made of and 
partially from the (environmental, social, legal, political, etc.) 
context in which the entity is located. However, there are countless 
entities for which the only way of getting at what they really are, and 
the only way of explaining why they behave how they do, is to look 
at the contexts that institute them, not the stuff they are made of. 
This is obviously true in the case of social institutions. Their 
nature, character and function are completely dependent on the 
socio-political context and cultural practices of a country or a 
community. Even though these are obviously instantiated by 
organizations of matter of some kind or another, the stuff they are 
made of doesn't make them the entities they are. And it certainly 
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doesn't help to explain why they behave in one way rather than 
another.  
 By making institution the metaphysically central notion in our 
explanatory accounts, we change the higher-to-lower explanatory 
strategy common to most naturalistic approaches mentioned above. 
The sense of triviality that our objector found in the Socrates' 
example seems to disappear when we thus change the character of 
the explanatory framework from the constitutive to the 
institutional. Socrates' death is indeed a good explanation of 
Xantippe's new marital status, in part because of the meaning of 
'widow'. The important point is that this meaning is not itself 
constituted by any internal physical properties of the agent who has 
thoughts about widows or who utters sentences in which the the 
word 'widow' appears. What determines that the term has the 
meaning it has is a largerly institutional matter, dependent mainly 
(although not exclusively) upon the social practices and activities of 
a community. That doesn't render the determinative relation that 
holds between Socrates' death and Xantippe's widowhood 
explanatorily empty. Rather, it changes the character of the 
explanatory framework itself. 
 
 
4. Lower-To-Higher Models of Explanation 
 
Unfortunately the claim that meaning is a purely institutional 
matter is to some extent just trivially true. Languages, qua systems 
of interpersonal communication, are obviously social phenomena. 
However, the claim and the extent to which the social dimension is 
of philosophical interest can be made more precise. Wittgenstein, 
Wittgensteinian and, in general, post-Hegelian philosophers have 
made powerful efforts to clarify the philosophical implications of 
such a 'trivial' claim. Among the latter, a recent example is Robert 
Brandom's analysis of linguistic content (Brandom 1994). This is one 
of the very few exceptions to the standard pattern of physicalist 
explanation criticized above, as is Adrian Cussins' work on the 
construction of meaning (Cussins unpublished). Both projects defy 
easy rehearsal. But they stand out as existence proofs of the 
potential richness of the alternative explanatory strategy. The 
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present paper is, in a sense, an exploration of the potential 
relevance of such work for the more general topic of naturalistic 
explanation in semantics. 
 Brandom's project is to develop a pragmatic account of the 
content of the expressions of a language framed in terms of a notion 
of commitment. Commitments are characterized by a kind of deontic 
status and deontic statuses are instituted (i.e., holistically 
constituted) by social practices. The metaphysical notion of 
institution (the notion of holistic constitution) is thus at the core of 
Brandom's pragmatic account of content: "our activity institutes 
norms, imposes normative significances on a natural world that is 
intrinsically without significance for the guidance or assessment of 
action' (Brandom 1994, 48). Adrian Cussins, in the same vein, 
claims: 
 
Cognizers participate in the maintenance and construction of 
normative activity systems which are larger, more complicated, 
more capable, and perhaps more meaningful than they 
themselves are. These systems —loci of meaning and value— 
include institutions, historically established cultures, social 
customs and norms, built environments, friendships, 
technologies, languages, arts and artefacts and facts. 
(Cussins unpublished, 4) 
 
 Cussins' project is an expression of what he calls 'naturalized 
transcendentalism'. But what is most interesting for our purposes 
is, again, the fact that institution lies at the core of the posited 
relations between representation and reference. Material, social and 
historical contingencies institute the complex network of normative 
activity systems that make human cognizers what they are. 
 To say that meaning is normative is to say that to know the 
meaning of an expression is to know how to use it correctly —even 
if that knowledge is not explicit. Any account of meaning should 
thus provide a set of constraints to which correct uses must 
conform. Satisfactory accounts of meaning should establish how the 
speakers' knowledge of the meaning of the expressions of a 
language enables them to use those expressions correctly. The key 
move in both Brandom's and Cussins' proposals is to make 
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normativity a central and irreducible feature of meaning. The goal of 
accounting for semantic properties in a naturalistic way thus 
becomes the goal of preserving (not discharging) that essential 
feature. As a result, the standard explanatory strategy is altered in 
many respects. First, no reductionist assumptions motivate this 
way of accounting for semantic properties. The normativity of 
linguistic content is the starting point and is treated as 
ineliminable. Second, although the normative dimension of language 
is not eliminable, it can be explained, so it is not treated as some 
kind of bare primitive. Third, the notion of explanation is not 
physicalistically biased; it is not framed in individualistic 
constitutive terms. Overall, then: 
... norms are understood as instituted by social-practical 
activity  ... [and] ... rendered less mysterious ... by explaining 
exactly what is expressed by normative vocabulary ... This is 
an explication of explicitly normative conceptual contents in 
terms of implicitly normative practices, rather than a 
reduction of normative terms to nonnormative ones. 
(Brandom 1994, xiii-xiv) 
 
 Both Brandom's and Cussins' projects involve myriad layers of 
complexity. Nonetheless the message is clear enough: there is 
indeed an alternative explanatory scheme to the prevalent higher-
to-lower one present in standard naturalization approaches. The 
point is not that we should abandon the standard, physicalistically 
biased, model of explanation altogether. It is rather that other, 
equally respectable explanatory strategies may be especially 
relevant to the treatment of meaning-based phenomena. 
 
 
5. Naturalism and Normativity 
 
So far, I have made explicit a general model of explanation that 
informs many naturalization projects in semantics. I have pointed 
out two important underlying physicalist assumptions governing 
that model: the demand for a causal, higher-to-lower explanatory 
strategy and the key role played by the metaphysical notion of 
individualistic constitution. I have also noted an alternative 
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strategy in which explanatory relations are grounded in the 
holistically characterized, socio-pragmatic notion of institution.  
 I would like to take now a further step and suggest that such 
non-causal, institution-based, approaches to explanation should be 
generally preferred to causal/individualistically constitutive models 
in the special context of naturalizing semantics. To make the case, I 
shall focus on one of the main problems that faces standard 
naturalization projects: the problem of demarcating cases of 
malfunction from cases of misrepresentation, and of distinguishing 
the latter from correct representation. This has been a recurrent 
theme, especially  in naturalistic proposals of the informational-
teleological kind. Attempts to solve this problem have turned the 
literature into a kind of intricate scholastic debate illuminated by a 
great profusion of baroque counterexamples. But there have been 
very few attempts to question the basic framework that shapes the 
problem itself. 
 How can a mental state be said to misrepresent without 
presupposing any semantic notions? When we say of an artifact 
such as e.g. a thermostat that it misrepresents the temperature of 
the room, we don't ascribe to it any original representational 
powers. What we are saying is just that there is a malfunction in 
the artifact. As Dretske notes (Dretske 1986), artifacts don't have 
'original representation'. If we are searching for original 
representation, one place to look is towards evolved structures 
whose adaptive role is that of gathering the information necessary 
for the creature's survival (it is also essential, for Dretske, that 
those structures allow the organism to be capable of associative 
learning). We thus first define a relation that beliefs bear to 
properties that are sometimes instantiated in the system's 
environment as the relation 'has as its content that'. The 
instantiation of a given property then explains why the production of 
a belief token in certain conditions helps the system perform its 
proper function. Instantiations of a property causally affect the 
system and are either developmentally (as in Dretske 1986) or 
evolutionarily (as in Millikan 1984) relevant with respect to the 
proliferation of the system. Once all this is in place, false beliefs 
are explained in terms of the direct malfunction of the evolved 
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structures or the alteration of the usual conditions in the 
environment (Cf. Millikan 1984)3. 
 Unfortunately, most situations in which an instantiated 
property counts as the cause of a given belief token are also 
situations in which other properties, co-instantiated with the first, 
are also possible causes of that belief token.  This is, roughly, the 
so-called 'disjunction problem' (Cf. e.g. Dretske 1986 and Fodor 
1990). The disjunction problem arises whenever a theory can't 
distinguish between a true token of a symbol that means something 
disjunctive, and a false tokening of a symbol that means something 
non-disjunctive. According to Fodor, the problem is so critical that 
the success of the whole project of naturalizing semantics depends 
on finding a solution within a naturalistic framework. Fodor gives 
the following gloss on one fairly typical, but ill-fated, kind of 
response to this problem: 
 
[perhaps] what determines the identity of the concept the 
student has learned is not the actual and counterfactual 
distribution of his tokenings,  ... but rather the distribution of 
actual and counterfactual punishments and rewards that 
prevails in the training situation. So, for example, imagine a 
student who has been reinforced for positive responses to 
apples, and suppose that no wax apples have been 
encountered. Then what determines that the student has 
learned the concept APPLE rather than the disjunctive 
concept APPLE OR WAX APPLE is that, were he to respond 
positively to a wax apple, the teacher (or some other 
environmental mechanism) would contrive to punish the 
response. 
(Fodor 1990, 63)4 
 
 It is, indeed, not uncommon to find that responses to the 
disjunction problem from within an informational-teleological 
framework involve the invocation of such additional normative 
apparatus. The presence of an actual teacher is, of course, optional. 
'Other environmental mechanisms' may do the job. But some 
externally determined notion of right and wrong response is always 
invoked —one whose reducibility to properties recognized by physics 
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is far from obvious. As a result, one basic problem that critics find 
with informational-teleological proposals is that they reflect an 
unstable mixture of reductionism (recall Fodor's opening quote) and 
the reluctant appreciation of the need to invoke some additional, 
genuinely normative, dimension for the explanation of meaning (see 
e.g. Smith 1990 and Loewer 1994)5. Informational-teleological 
accounts are thus in trouble because, despite their naturalistic 
aspirations, they are forced to invoke relations with a very clearly 
normative character (punishment and reward) —a normative 
character that cannot help but compromise the project of physicalist 
reductionism itself. 
 Such problem, I think, will recur whenever we try to naturalize 
semantics following a higher-to-lower explanatory strategy. For the 
individualistic notion of constitution upon which standard 
naturalization projects are built is so determinedly physicalist that 
it cannot, ultimately, make contact with the normative features it is 
trying to explain. Standard projects are thus forced to 'cheat' by 
impregnating the merely physical with normative notions that don't 
belong there. By treating normativity as ineliminable from semantics 
and by understanding normativity as instituted by practical 
activities in a social world, we avoid such a double jeopardy. The 
committed naturalist, if I am right, should thus whole-heartedly 
embrace an alternative explanatory strategy, one which locates the 
normative dimension of intentionality in its natural home: the 








1. See e.g. Fodor 1989, Jackson 1996, Jackson and Pettit 1990, 
Lepore and Loewer 1987, Segal and Sober 1991. 
 
2. Of course, similar considerations have been invoked in 
support of functionalism, a paradigmatically internalist position in 
Artificial Intelligence. The difference is that, for the functionalist, 
the role involves only permissible moves in a inner economy, 
whereas, for the institutionalist, the roles are defined in terms of 
wider, usually socio-pragmatic, settings. 
 
3. There are, of course, important differences between Dretske's 
informational and Millikan's teleological accounts. Dretske is 
mainly concerned with how causes local to an organism give rise to 
the content of that organism's particular thoughts. Millikan, by 
contrast, stresses evolutionary history. These differences, however, 
need not concern us here. 
 
4. Fodor's gloss claims to reflect Dretske's favored response to 
the disjunction problem. Our interest, however, lies not in the 
accuracy of any such attribution, but in the general shape of a fairly 
wide variety of naturalist responses —a shape nicely captured by 
Fodor's description. 
 
5. Interestingly, Fodor's own causal proposal has been criticized 
for exactly the same reasons, namely, that no causal condition can 
explain reference except in conjunction with further intentional 
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